Mad Lemming

Submission to the Upper Tribunal

 

Jeff Lampert`s Skeleton Argument

GIA/3422/2016

  1. I would like to thank the Tribunal for allowing me to deal with a personal issue and delaying this Hearing. As you are probably aware, my family and I were evicted from our family home in 1999 which is at the root of my litigation actions.

  2. I have been suffering from various health issues and my wife suffered from breast cancer and recently had an open-heart surgery. Currently, research is being done on the effect of evictions and health issues (please refer to links below A, B & C).

    A; https://independentaustralia.net/life/life-display/victims-of-bank-corruption-suffer-emotional-trauma-on-top-of-financial-ruin,11550,

    B; https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/the-emergence-of-post-traumatic-foreclosure-disorder/

    C; https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-01-enormous-impact-evictions-mental-health.html

  3. Very recently, I have been told that a close member of my family supports and is benefiting from the evil of eviction based on the abuse of Personal Guarantees. I needed some time to try and deal with different health issues quite possibly deriving from all this. I am not sure I have. Or ever will.

  4. In 2011, I co-founded an organisation, now known as diyLAW. Experts have advised me that my legal case has led to many evictions that otherwise may not have happened.

  5. In view of my recent health issues, I become more and more aware of the link between body and mind. diyLAW has been a great advocate for detaching emotions from litigation. I clearly have failed miserably in this instance. I now ask myself if this detachment is possible for other litigants in person. diyLAW will be exploring this question.

  6. This is my submission to the Tribunal in connection with the appeal against the decision of First Tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 20th of September 2016. This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the DPA 1998 s59:

    6.1. The FTT on the 20th of September 2016 at point 48 in its decision confirmed “the statute states what the statute states”.

    6.2. As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" .

    6.3. When the ICO exercises its discretion in this matter equity must be considered. Equity requires parties to have “clean hands”. (“He who comes to Equity must come with clean hands”). I attempt to demonstrate in this document at points 6, 7, 8 & 12, 13, 14 to this Tribunal that the FCA does not “come with clean hands”.

    6.4, The ICO have twice requested the documents in question to be released to me which the FCA twice denied.

    6.5. I submit that a concealment based on perjury must not prevail against Justice. It should not be a public policy to allow regulation to supress criminality.

    6.6. The requested documents could potentially be vital in overturning the precedent that had been used to abuse hundreds of thousands of victims. This was confirmed by Kay Linnell MBA, FCA, FEWI a Forensic Accountant. diyLAW is working with the CJC, the MoJ, and among others the FCA itself to establish a platform to help these victims.

    6.7. “The statute states what the statute states”. This hearing appears to assume the statute meant to say something else. There is no evidence of that. If the ICO wish to change the statute I submit they need to follow the process (https://bit.ly/2RCVVFH on page 650 paragraph 1&2).

    6.8. The statute chose the word business an “etymological chameleon” (as per the cited FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8) to give the ICO maximum discretion on disclosure. J Briggs`s judgment is highly relevant. It would be a crime against Equity if the FCA was allowed to continue the concealment by denying the existence on oath of Joel Scott that documents that exist and are the subject of this action.

  7. This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the relevant statute quoted at point 48 of the FTT decision: “the statute states what the statute states”. I am convinced “the statute states what the statute states” for a reason. Accepting the term “business” is an “etymological chameleon” as per the ICO`s reference to FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8, one must believe the learned MPs during the readings of the Data Protection Bill in 1998 endorsed the definition of the word “business” to give the ICO discretion in matters like this. It is incumbent on the ICO to use the discretion justly and in accordance with what was in Parliament`s mind. In this instance by refusing to provide the public with the documents being requested, the ICO is apparently concealing an alleged perjury by Stephen Charles Ball (formerly of Lloyds Bank) and that perjury appears to be compounded by the alleged perjury of Joel Christopher Scott of the FCA.

  8. Further to my very recent conversation with Frazer Hunt at the FCA`s Complaints Department, he confirmed the "matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal" on the 12th of December 2018. Added as evidence 30 downloadable at https://bit.ly/2FGYGzs Therefore, I made a request for this Tribunal to make an order for the FCA to release the requested documents. Briggs J heard this matter in relation to CPR 31.17 in 2010 (as suggested at point 67-68 of the FTT decision). I believe the alleged perjured affidavit has not been disclosed by the FCA and I believe that Briggs J`s hearing on 22nd of January 2010 was misled by the FCA into believing there were no more documents. The FSA/FCA apparently ceased their investigation into the Heritage-case in 2008. Clearly, they have additional information about the Perjured Affidavit they are not sharing. They misled Briggs about its existence. At point 10 of evidence no. 26 of Briggs Judgment Briggs J makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007 ”. I would suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document, Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it”. Briggs J concludes his judgment by stating “...I am sorry to disappoint Mr Lampert”. Furthermore, there is some major confusion around Joel Christopher Scott (employee of the then FSA)`s witness statement that is frequently quoted and referred to in Briggs J`s decision, yet the Witness Statement is dated 16 March 2010, which is about two months after the date of Briggs J`s decision. The FCA Complaints Department suggested I took this matter to the Tribunal “Although you have stated that the witness statement provided by the FCA was untrue, your reason for believing this is connected to information that the FCA purportedly held. This matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal”. Email from Frazer Hunt on the 12th of December 2018 as evidence 31 As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 and by the ICO`s own website, the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "What we do, Our role is to uphold information rights in the public interest." (https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/) "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" . It is clear the ICO can release these documents without the FCA`s permission.

  9. Parliament have decided that word “business” is an “etymological chameleon” with the actual definition depending on the context. Regarding the ICO`s submission concerning the meaning of the word "business" as per the Data Protection Bill 1998 section 59 (1) we could argue about the word`s specific meaning in this context forever. However, I suggest the ICO would need to show what was in Parliament’s minds to allow the use of this word to cover up an alleged perjury leading to hundreds of thousands of citizens being evicted from their homes for the benefit of the financial community. I believe the definition of the word “business” has deliberately been made flexible to allow ICO to exercise its discretion. Furthermore, I have been referred to Hansard records by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as “The information you have requested in available online at the Hansard website: https://hansard.parliament.uk/.” I suggest this may be done by the ICO who have the resources. My argument remains, as I was advised by Prof Nigel Harper former HMRC Banking expert that the following definition would take precedence over all other in Law. The case HMRC at HM Revenue and Customs v Salaried Persons Postal Loans Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 763 (Ch), Times 20-Apr-06 led to a definition of business activity currently being used by HMRC "business activity means carrying on a trade or profession, or buying and selling goods or services with a view to making a profit or surplus".

  10. It is my strong belief that the precedent set by my case has an enormous role in the current banking/insolvency crisis, especially with references to criminality such as an allegedly perjured Affidavit. I have been advised by a leading solicitor that it should not be public policy to allow regulation to suppress criminality.

  11. With regards to ground 4 in the original submission in front of the First Tier Tribunal in 2016, the public interest has changed and is continuing to change in the direction of transparency and disclosure and openness – which is referred to at point 39 of the cited Cialfi v ICO & Cabinet Office case - especially in the banking insolvency area as shown in Australia (https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/live-banking-and-finance-royal-commission-findings-20180928-p506ke.html) and by the excellent works of the Disclosure Working Group (https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/press-annoucement-disclosure-pilot-approved-by-cprc.pdf). I am convinced proper disclosure of documents may help everyone better understand the abuse of Banking Law. Much of this is due to the efforts of Anthony Stansfeld, Police & Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley.

  12. I am convinced that the FCA is clearly concealing something that is relevant in a case involving an allegedly perjured Affidavit by a bank manager and is tainting the reputation of the ICO and the Courts with that concealment. (The closed part of the FTT hearing was described as "Consideration of the Closed Material, however, while helpful and informative, has not materially influenced the Tribunal`s decision” at point 44 of the First Tier Tribunal decision) An email from Greg Choyce would suggest the FCA were aware of this matter at this highest level. I refer again to point 10 of evidence no. 26 (Briggs Judgment) where the Judge makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007”. I would again suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it.” I now strongly believe there is evidence. I respectfully ask this Tribunal to confirm whether the documents I am seeking would have allowed Briggs J to "go behind" Joel Christopher Scott`s evidence.

  13. The effect of the concealment (of the allegedly perjured Affidavit) by the FCA has been to allow the Court of Appeal (LLOYDS BANK PLC V LAMPERT & ANOR, COURT OF APPEAL - CIVIL DIVISION, NOVEMBER 25, 1998, [1998] EWCA CIV 1840) to stand since 1998. evidence no. 5 on page 45 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018 This has set the precedent that "on demand” means “on demand” (2 banking hours) and that the secured lender can go straight for the Guarantor without first seeking repayment from the Borrower. As best we can tell, this has resulted in hundreds of thousands of evictions that may not have happened (see Experts` Views on page 9 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018) without this judgment. It is our intention at diyLAW to continue to work with the legal authorities to establish a process to reverse these flawed decisions. diyLAW will also continue to work with Positive Money, as we believe they are the leading experts on the complicated subject of money creation. diyLAW has been circulating #PGcrimes on social media to identify the extent of this banking crisis and to provide information that may help victims.

  14. The ICO throughout this litigation has failed to deal with the very important public interest point. Police and Crime Commissioner Anthony Stansfeld, who takes the lead for PCCs nationally on major fraud, has been in contact with Richard Bailey at the ICO requesting the release of the document due to relevance to other cases on the 22nd of January 2019. email attached as evidence 32 The Tribunal hopefully will decide the public interest issue which involves PCC Anthony Stansfeld overrides whether or not the FCA may be considered a business for the purposes of section 59 DPA. I do not intend to make any further submission on the public interest issue.

  15. Furthermore, my submission for a Private Criminal Prosecution before DJ Cooper has moved on since the FTT decision in September 2016. I suggest that I am entitled to this information even though we have not appealed it as it was meant to go through a Judicial Review. The closed session at the First Tier Tribunal hearing concealed relevant information and the reasoning behind the JR decision was opaque and I have not been able to comprehend it, and nor has it been explained to me. I have appealed that decision as far as possible within the UK. as per the attached document from the Court of Appeal in C1/2017/1490 as evidence 34 As per comments of Charles Harris QC (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/there-is-no-access-to-justice-if-the-public-cannot-understand-it-przdt50rn), I believe I should be provided with a thorough explanation of the C of A decision (reference number: C1/2017/1490).

  16. Anthony Stansfeld, Police Crime Commissioner of Thames Valley Police, needs to be supported in his investigations into Lloyds Bank in Bristol. I will be supporting PCC Stansfeld as best as I can, and I assume Richard Bailey will do the same.

  17. I respectfully ask this Tribunal to instruct the ICO to release the requested documents to me. I apologise for not having had the opportunity to review the precedent sent by the ICO but believe they are in the main precedents set by the FTT and support release of the documents into the public domain.

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

DRAFT article Philip Green

  1. Very recently the Sunday Times published an article criticising Sir Philip Green (PG) for being rude to one of his directors at Amber Day in the late eighties. PG may have acted correctly; if only all the rest of us saw what PG may have seen!
  2. The director PG was referring to, Leslie Warman (LW), sat on the board of Amber Day whilst he was also employed as a director of Lloyds Merchant Bank. Lloyds Merchant Bank is now defunct.
  3. Leslie was a close adviser to me at Heritage plc: he was the director mentioned in the Portuguese article.
  4. He was also a director of Tams Industries, another IPO issued at the same time as Heritage Plc.
  5. PG got heavily criticised for the Amber Day incident.
  6. LW ensured I got rid of my then Financial Director before Heritage floated. This enabled LMB to float Heritage with a member of the ICAEW (instead of a cost and works accountant as FD), and enabled the prospectus to mislead on the value of the debtors and creditors, something I only found out 20 years after the flotation.
  7. But Tams suffered the most. Tams, advised by LW went on an acquisition programme as Heritage had done. I stopped on Grey Monday, as I recognised I was not capable of leading the companies I was being encouraged to acquire.
  8. Gerald Tams got cancer and died.
  9. Tams, which was the very very best manufacturer of ceramic housewares I had seen anywhere in the world, went bust
  10. I struggled on from the float that should never have happened.
  11. And PG, without the advice of LW (who was there to earn "City fees" for his employer, LMB) reached his full potential, until the City advised him to do the stupid BHS deal.

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Know your litigation

  1. At a meeting with the LiP Support Strategy this week I expressed the thought that diyLAW was, due to my history, may be too focused on Bank crimes.
  2. Then - out of the blue-  this letter from my wife’s building insurer arrived.
  3. Very briefly she had a central heating leak causing water damage in our home.
  4. The repair of the leak was not insured, she had paid for the repair. The damage caused by the water leak was insured.
  5. The whole of our downstairs is tiled with the same tile. Some tiles were dug up in order to make the repair. Digging them up destroyed them. It has not been possible to match these tiles up, as they had been laid for some years.
  6. I have been attempting to come up with a solution by clever design for the repaired section, rather than dig up the whole of our ground floor to match tiles now available.
  7. In this process, I have been in contact with the builder, the insurers` loss assessor/adjustor, and their surveyor and an interior designer. This has been going on for some six months.
  8. The letter quoted above “voided” my wife’s insurance claim immediately. They took this action because they claimed failure to disclose business use.
  9. The Agent was at all times aware of my wife`s "business". 
  10. My wife had been very open with the Agent, who she knew well as he had previously arranged mortgages for her.
  11. On investigation, the insurer seems to have a strange web presence. It was highly praised in some reviews – that all seem to have been posted within a short period of time - and slated in others
  12. I found the MD`s direct telephone line and had a conversation with him, which he terminated abruptly.
  13. The conversation was about the claim, whether the agent who arranged the insurance: was the insurance company`s agent or my wife’s agent.
  14. It then went onto discuss the meaning of “business” (shades of my ICO/FCA litigation).
  15. The MD suggested my wife should follow the formal procedure: a complaint from the agent to Vasek as they have no direct contact with their client, then the Ombudsman, and then legal action.
  16. This may possibly take forever and a day, and potentially wears the claimant down into dropping the claim.
  17. My wife then suggested I should look at the Act that was being quoted when they “voided” her insurance for alleged “non-disclosure”.
  18. The Act appears to have been updated: it is now virtually impossible to prove “non-disclosure” in order to void an insurance claim where an agent has been involved (as per the Financial Ombudsman`s publication). 
  19. No matter what litigation you are involved in, this episode demonstrates you need to involve others, keep updated and do not rely on the other side`s interpretation of the Law. 
  20. The Law and the Judiciary are invariably fairer than the other side’s presentation to you.
  21. Watch this space!

 

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

SME solution?

 

  1. A personal friend of mine, Chairman of iconic British brand name company, granted Lloyds Bank (LB) a Personal Guarantee (PG) on part of that company’s debt to LB. Allegedly, the assets of the company were many times the debt to LB. The Chairman was advised by the Bank this was a “token gesture”. Lawyers looked at the Guarantee and advised the Chairman it was the “standard form”.
  2. Within four months LB received an offer for and then sold the debt to a “vulture fund” (VF) specialising in buying brand names. This was against the Chairman`s wishes. Allegedly, LB refused to listen to other offers to buy the debt.
  3. The VF, now owning the debt, demanded and purchased the shares in the Company owned by the Chairman and his family.
  4. The VF then carried out a rapid pre-pack, selling the company back to the VF, at an allegedly very low value.
  5. The VF claimed to the Chairman his PG was now crystallized, and they, not LB owned it. They coerced him into waiving a service contract with a 10% holding of the company.
  6. As with many other iconic brand companies purchased by this VF, the company has now gone through another insolvency process.
  7. It seems this VF is better at using or abusing our insolvency rules and PGs than running iconic British brand companies, at a substantial cost to the UK`s brand name heritage. Supposedly just this brand was worth more than £100m.
  8. Misusing the purpose of PGs was part of this process.
  9. Perhaps, the ultimate misuse of PG’s was when NAMA sold several billions of loans to Cerberus for roughly 25% of face value.
  10. Cerberus then sold these loans to the Guarantors for roughly 50% of the Guarantee value.
  11. Cerberus made 100% gross profit on the transaction.
  12. Signing a PG again is tantamount to signing a blank cheque. (https://thelawdictionary.org/personal-guarantee/)
  13. When you sign a Guarantee you are not told it can be sold to a third party.
  14. The secured lender has little or no responsibility to the Guarantor to collect the debts from the borrower before calling on the Guarantee.
  15. Neither does any insolvency practitioner appointed by the secured lender have any worthwhile responsibility to the Guarantor to collect from the borrower before the Guarantee is called on.
  16. It is not surprising that signing a Guarantee is the same as signing a blank cheque.
  17. In my case, I took top legal advice and I signed a £500k Guarantee of “last resort” of the debt of Heritage plc.
  18. The receivers appear to have collected £5m against a debt of £3m from Heritage plc to LB. My Guarantee was called on, but I have no idea where the missing recoveries are.
  19. The Receivers have little “duty of care” to the Guarantor.
  20. Further, in my case, LB appear to have entered a perjured Affidavit to claim a false £1.5m shortfall against the £3m debt to justify the call on my Guarantee.
  21. The FSA investigated the Heritage recovery figure in 2008, but refuse to provide me with the result of that investigation.
  22. My attempts to see that investigation through the Freedom of Information Act are now in the Court of Appeal and the Upper Tier Tribunal.
  23. A PCP against the alleged perjurer is in a Bristol Court.
  24. A PG is again a blank cheque. PGs need to be regulated.
  25. Why did Hector Sants, when he was head of the FCA, resolve the PPI situation by bringing an action through the Courts? http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/insurance/8462864/PPI-banks-lose-battle-against-FSA.html
  26. Why is Andrew Bailey attempting to put the PG situation under the FCA’s dust-laden carpet?
  27. I suggest the UK urgently needs a Tribunal Service to look at the abuse of PGs.

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Déjà vu

At the SME Alliance Meeting in the House of Commons following the debate on RBS
treatment of SMEs
on Thursday, 18 January


Jeff Lampert, the founder of diyLAW, declared "deja vu".


The similarities between two debates on the same subject, nineteen years apart, demonstrate that regulation of banks has gone backwards. Lloyds Bank and RBS were mentioned in both debates, but in the one in May 1999 RBS was praised, not criticised.

The FSA was not mentioned in May 1999, the FCA was rightly heavily criticised yesterday.
Jeff Lampert currently has ground-breaking "once removed" litigation against the FCA.
Asked to comment Jeff said " if the Government had acted properly after the first debate, the content of the debate yesterday would not have been so heart-breaking"...


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Litigation in London v Litigation in Lisbon

When Heritage Plc was closed in 2  hours by Lloyds Bank in 1996 two litigations followed. One in London against Lloyds Bank and Grant Thornton (GT), one in Lisbon, against members of the establishment. Some topline comparison between the two jurisdictions is interesting.

The Lisbon one has just been settled and I am receiving €400 pm into an account I have recently opened in Cascais, Portugal. Not a princely sum, but the original investment was only £50k. The London litigation is ongoing and is for a significant amount.

I started Heritage in 1980. By 1982 it was looking to expand into ceramic housewares. I “stumbled”  across a manufacturer of throw-away ceramic pate dishes, Cerexport; between us we developed Heritage pottery a range of oven-to-tableware. The pottery was very profitable for both of us: we both floated on our different stock market 5 years later.

I was offered pre-flotation Cerexport shares. A director of Lloyds Merchant Bank who was advising me on Heritage’s forthcoming flotation asked if he could also benefit from this. We both bought £50k. These purchases were facilitated by a company owned by Cerexport’s marketing director, who was also a director of Heritage.

Cerexport’s flotation coincided with Black Monday and a fall in share price.  The Lloyds director suggested he got our cheques stopped, which I did not allow. Both the Lloyds director and I received a certificate from a Lisbon stock broker confirming they were holding our (bearer) shares. The very day that Lloyds Bank appointed GT as conflicted Admin Receivers to Heritage the marketing director of Cerexport was in London discussing the logistics of a £500k order for a Woolworths promotion. The appointment came as a surprise to everyone. Going forward it was suggested that if necessary we could start a new company, starting with that Woolworths-order.

When asked what I was going to use as finance, I suggested we started with the shares in Cerexport. To which I was asked, “what shares?”. Coming, at that time, from someone I had considered a friend was a nasty shock. The Lloyds director and I took our share certificates to the Portuguese Stock Exchange, who investigated. They (CMVH) confirmed we had been the victims of a crime, by this time eleven years ago.

The first difference I then became aware of was that Portugal had a limitation of 10 years on criminal actions, unlike the UK, where there is no limitation on crime. CMVH suggested we bring a civil case, which was not subject to limitation, as it would be in the UK, and CMVH would support such an action. The action was against 3 defendants, the Marketing Director of Cerexport, the stockbroker who provided the certificates and the owner of the brokerage who also at that time ”owned” Cerexport. A bank that had subsequently bought the brokerage was involved as an “interested party”. CMVH also said that the defence was roughly translated that each defendant was claiming that another defendant had committed the crime. Our first firm of solicitors, who were happy to accept the case on contingency, was, in fact, a Brazilian firm, who had no right of audience before a Lisbon court. Where we had believed this firm was instructing barristers, they were, in fact, instructing an entirely independent firm of advocates, who were not part of the contingency arrangement.

The second thing we learnt is that Lisbon has advocates, not solicitors and barristers. Our next firm was a small firm that was relocating from London to Lisbon. I went to Lisbon, met with our new solicitor and the solicitors from the other side, and thought I had agreed a settlement. Subsequently, I was advised that it had not been agreed by all parties. My new solicitor, whilst pointing out that I had a brilliant case, now wanted a monthly retainer to continue.

The third thing I learnt was to maintain my cynicism. The Lloyds director did not continue with the litigation. The next firm of advocates was what I thought a branch of a British firm. When the Lisbon office started to chase me for fees that had not been agreed, I found out that the London and Lisbon offices were no longer connected. I clearly had a case proven to a criminal level, but could not find a professional in Lisbon to bring it. With my two words of Portuguese, I could not do that myself. Through the Chamber of Commerce I met ME and F. Particularly I liked Miguel Costa from that firm. We agreed a fee. Sometime later I was called over for a Hearing in Court.

I was aware that in Lisbon everyone pays their own costs, win or lose. Which was fortunate as one of the defendants was being represented by the former Attorney General of Portugal. There appeared to be a number of untruths in the evidence submitted by the other side. Miguel explained that Portuguese Courts have more tolerance of perjury than UK ones. The Hearing was conducted by a professional Judge. Yet another difference from the UK was that Judges become trainee judges without first being barristers.

Lisbon has a different concept relating to disclosure. Disclosing the CMVH report, I disclosed my entire case. I was cross-examined by the Judge, then the advocates for the defence. Then I was sat down with my interpreter next to the main defendant, and the Judge cross-examined us in tandem. To some of his answers, the Judge commented a Portuguese word which Miguel translated for me as “incredible”! The Judge found for me and also fined the main defendant €800 for litigating in bad faith.

The Judgment was appealed on the grounds that I MAY have collected the shares from the stockbroker. Miguel then did a brilliant job proving a negative.

 

 

Dedicated to my friend Miguel Costa who very sadly died in the recent forest fires in Portugal.

 

 

 

Update from the late Miguel Costa`s firm in Portugal:

Dear Jeffrey,

Thank you so much for this great article! We are very grateful for your action.

Miguel would be very flattered for your kind words.

Sofia

Martínez-Echevarría & Ferreira – Sociedade de Advogados


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.