access to justice

Challenging the Upper Tribunal decision

 

Jeff Lampert’s submission to challenge the Upper Tribunal`s decision of 14th of February 2019

GIA/3422/2016

I wish to challenge the Upper Tribunal’s decision of 1st of March 2019 (ref.: GIA/3422/2016) by raising "some important point, principle and practice" and there are "some other compelling reason".

  1. The tribunal has always been aware that the FCA not being a business is a gateway to receiving the documents. The Tribunal has also been aware that by the below finding I am denied access to information I would otherwise be entitled to, which would confirm the alleged perjury of SCB.

  2. Receiving the documents has always been the reason for this litigation, and that has been recognised by the Tribunal ("...if you win on the business point, you are home and dry. If you lose on the business point then we have to consider what we call gateway points." Judge Lloyd-Davies, 7 March 2017) Even though, the Tribunal, later on, decided not to give permission on any other grounds other than the "business"-point; it appears from the way the respected Judge expressed this point, I might be able to refer to the gateways following to the UT decision.

  3. This article (https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2018/september/high-court-rejects-privilege-claim/) raises the question of whether public bodies like the ICO benefits from special privileges reserved for regulators, while they also fit the definition of the word "business". The FCA repeatedly describes itself as a Regulator on its website. I can find nowhere where it describes itself as a business. If this judgment is allowed to stand every regulator can hide behind it, and describe itself as a business, which will stand in the way of transparency, and impede the function of the ICO. The ICO having discretion as a responsible for both the DPA and the FOIA I submit would have been Parliament's wish. It was never their intention to allow the FCA to interfere with this discretion, as they are now doing, by refusing the ICO permission to share these documents with me, under the pretence of being a business.

  4. I also request this Tribunal to continue with the investigation into the Witness Statement of Joel Scott. This has been suggested by the FCA's Complaint's department (as per Evidence 31 in the submitted bundle for the hearing on the 24 January 2019).

  5. The Commissioner’s very firm original letter to the FCA seeking permission to release the requested documents to me, as clearly the Commissioner acting in the public interest. Has the Commissioner changed her mind? It appears that since the powerful original letter by the Commissioner (8th of November 2013) the public interest has enormously increased in this area. The Commissioner claims in the most recent letter to have considered a public interest. She does not explain any basis for her very important decision as quoted in the letter sent to me by Richard Bailey on 28th of March 2019. I can bring several hundred thousand people who will disagree with that decision. (as per Evidence 15 starting on page 100 in the submitted bundle for the hearing on the 24 January 2019)

  6. "Legislators and policy makers recognise that the public interest will change over time and according to the circumstances of each situation." https://www.ucl.ac.uk/political-science/publications/unit-publications/134.pdf

  7. On what basis did the ICO decide which Public Interest weighs more in this case, especially, when we take the change of time and circumstances into account (as per the study above)? Have they consulted with someone like Anthony Stansfeld, Police Crime Commissioner, or considered equity?

  8. I am convinced the documents requested refer to perjury by SCB. The CoA decision in 1998, as a result of that perjury, has become an integral part of the "the largest theft, anywhere, ever” (Clive Lewis MP, MP for South Norwich, 26 Jan 2018).

  9. This CoA decision resulting from that perjury allows the banks to proceed against the guarantor without having to proceed against the borrower. This decision also allows the banks to call on loans within 2 banking hours. The combination is toxic for all Guarantors. The best estimation is hundreds of thousands of people have been affected by this. (as per Evidence 5 starting on page 45 in the submitted bundle for the hearing on the 24 January 2019)

  10. My submission is based on that this important point or principle is whether regulation, of the FOIA and the DPA, should be allowed to suppress criminality, such as an alleged perjured affidavit.

  11. The regulation is this decision, that the FCA is a business, and I am therefore denied access to documents relating to the perjured value of recoveries at Heritage plc. The case which set the precedent that has caused pain and anguish to guarantors of SMEs, such as PTSD.

  12. The criminality being the alleged perjured affidavit of SCB (formerly?) of Lloyds Bank. The perjury case rests with DJ Cooper. Currently, DJ Cooper is awaiting the outcome of a suggested police investigation. (as per Evidence 18 starting on page 150 in the submitted bundle for the hearing on the 24 January 2019)

  13. We have asked Trevor Melheam to initiate a police investigation through his connection at the local Crime Commissioner level.

  14. I believe Joel Scott of the FCA statement misled Briggs J which prevented the documents being available under normal disclosure rules (CPR 31.7). This is yet another example of the FCA abusing, misleading, and making the judicial system look foolish. (as per Evidence 26 & Evidence 29 in the submitted bundle for the hearing on the 24 January 2019)

  15. We believe granting access to these documents will support the process and save huge amounts of time for the court and the police which has always been a priority for me. The compelling reason to provide this information is I have been advised of the requirement to win my case first by Kay Linnell. Kay is not only the expert witness who has looked at my case, but has previously been MD of the Joint Insolvency Monitoring Unit and is an acknowledged expert in this field. The correspondence between the ICO and the FSA/FSA demonstrate how hard the ICO tried to get the information to me in 2013 & 2015. I was only prevented from seeing it by the instructions of the FSA/FCA.

  16. This recent judgment – that is currently being appealed - has confirmed that whether or not I get the documents needs to be a decision of the ICO, not the FCA. Reference to the correspondence (between 8 November 2013 and 27 July 2015) demonstrate the extent to which the FCA have put pressure on the ICO to continue concealing the document. This is demeaning to the ICO and therefore it cannot be in the public interest.

  17. Once I have won my litigation and proven the perjury, it is my intention to seek reversal of the decision. Many thousands of people who have suffered from what was described in Parliament as the “the largest theft, anywhere, ever” may be able to benefit from the questioning of what is an integral part of that theft.

  18. More details about the case: https://www.diylaw.co/personal-guarantee-campaign/2019/3/19/public-interest-submission

Jeff Lampert

29 March 2019

Previous correspondence:

The First Tier Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

The Upper Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

Note to the ICO dated 14th of March 2019 at 12:37.

The ICO`s response.

Response to the ICO dated 19th of March 2019


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Response to the ICO

 

Jeff Lampert’s response to the ICO

GIA/3422/2016

Dear Richard,

  1. Following the judgment of Lloyd Davies 1 March, I now request you release the information under section 59 (2) of the DPA gateway (d) and (e).

  2. The perjury litigation has progressed and indeed there is a potential additional perjury action against the FCA.

  3. The public interest in crimes by banks against SMEs has changed dramatically since my original request.

  4. Should you require evidence of the above, I will provide it.

  5. When making your decision, I will ask you to consider the public interest in maintaining confidentiality with the FCA.

  6. Should your decision be not to release this information, I will appeal to Lloyd-Davies under the heading "any other compelling reason" and also seek a judicial review of the ICO`s decision on "gateways".

Jeff Lampert

Previous correspondence:

The First Tier Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

The Upper Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

Note to the ICO dated 14th of March 2019 at 12:37.

The ICO`s response.


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Jeff Lampert’s response to the Upper Tribunal’s Decision

 

Jeff Lampert’s response to the Upper Tribunal’s Decision

Public Interest

GIA/3422/2016

Dear Richard,

  1. On the 1st of March 2019, the Upper Tribunal decided that the FCA is a business for the purpose of the DPA.

  2. This closed the avenue of the FCA documents you are holding to be released into the public domain.

  3. However, the UT also decided it is within the ICO's discretion, acting as a public authority, as to what should be released into the public domain. This is your decision alone.

  4. It is in the public interest for you to immediately release those documents.

  5. Those documents relate to the allegedly perjured affidavit of SCB in the Court of Appeal (Lloyds Bank Plc v Jeffrey Lampert, Vanessa Lampert: CA 25 Nov 1998. [1998] EWCA Civ 1840).

  6. That case set the precedent which allowed secured lenders to litigate directly against Guarantors without having to go to the Borrower first.

  7. That case also decided that 2 banking hours was sufficient time to give a company to repay a guaranteed loan.

  8. I am sure you can see how toxic the combination is to guarantors of company loans.

  9. You are holding the documents that will support the allegedly perjured Affidavit. The case is currently with DJ Cooper in Bristol.

  10. It is my intention to present the matter to Trevor Mealham, who is assisting Avon and Somerset Police in their investigation into Lloyds Bristol where SCB was employed. I will also seek the involvement of Anthony Stansfeld, Police Crime Commissioner of Thames Valley Police, who has expressed an interest in this matter.

  11. During the litigation referred to above, it has emerged that in my previous litigation (under CPR31) trying to get the same information before DBR Briggs, Joel Scott of the FCA claimed this information did not exist. A recent complaint to the FCA resulted in their suggestion that I take the matter to Court or a Tribunal.

  12. This is another reason for the ICO to put the information into the public domain.

  13. J Lloyd Davies has also suggested that should I not be successful on the "business" point I should look at the other gateways again.

  14. Richard, as you are aware diyLAW has been working with the legal establishment to create a computerised process that can make some recompense to the many thousands of people who have been evicted as a result of this flawed Judgment referred to at point 5.

  15. It must be in the public interest for the ICO to support this initiative.

  16. I reserve my position on appealing the decision of Lloyds Davies.

  17. Richard, I would appreciate an immediate response before I take any further actions.

Jeff Lampert

The First Tier Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

The Upper Tribunal`s decision in this matter.

The ICO`s response.


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Submission to the Upper Tribunal

 

Jeff Lampert`s Skeleton Argument

GIA/3422/2016

  1. I would like to thank the Tribunal for allowing me to deal with a personal issue and delaying this Hearing. As you are probably aware, my family and I were evicted from our family home in 1999 which is at the root of my litigation actions.

  2. I have been suffering from various health issues and my wife suffered from breast cancer and recently had an open-heart surgery. Currently, research is being done on the effect of evictions and health issues (please refer to links below A, B & C).

    A; https://independentaustralia.net/life/life-display/victims-of-bank-corruption-suffer-emotional-trauma-on-top-of-financial-ruin,11550,

    B; https://livinglies.wordpress.com/2016/04/06/the-emergence-of-post-traumatic-foreclosure-disorder/

    C; https://medicalxpress.com/news/2018-01-enormous-impact-evictions-mental-health.html

  3. Very recently, I have been told that a close member of my family supports and is benefiting from the evil of eviction based on the abuse of Personal Guarantees. I needed some time to try and deal with different health issues quite possibly deriving from all this. I am not sure I have. Or ever will.

  4. In 2011, I co-founded an organisation, now known as diyLAW. Experts have advised me that my legal case has led to many evictions that otherwise may not have happened.

  5. In view of my recent health issues, I become more and more aware of the link between body and mind. diyLAW has been a great advocate for detaching emotions from litigation. I clearly have failed miserably in this instance. I now ask myself if this detachment is possible for other litigants in person. diyLAW will be exploring this question.

  6. This is my submission to the Tribunal in connection with the appeal against the decision of First Tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 20th of September 2016. This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the DPA 1998 s59:

    6.1. The FTT on the 20th of September 2016 at point 48 in its decision confirmed “the statute states what the statute states”.

    6.2. As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" .

    6.3. When the ICO exercises its discretion in this matter equity must be considered. Equity requires parties to have “clean hands”. (“He who comes to Equity must come with clean hands”). I attempt to demonstrate in this document at points 6, 7, 8 & 12, 13, 14 to this Tribunal that the FCA does not “come with clean hands”.

    6.4, The ICO have twice requested the documents in question to be released to me which the FCA twice denied.

    6.5. I submit that a concealment based on perjury must not prevail against Justice. It should not be a public policy to allow regulation to supress criminality.

    6.6. The requested documents could potentially be vital in overturning the precedent that had been used to abuse hundreds of thousands of victims. This was confirmed by Kay Linnell MBA, FCA, FEWI a Forensic Accountant. diyLAW is working with the CJC, the MoJ, and among others the FCA itself to establish a platform to help these victims.

    6.7. “The statute states what the statute states”. This hearing appears to assume the statute meant to say something else. There is no evidence of that. If the ICO wish to change the statute I submit they need to follow the process (https://bit.ly/2RCVVFH on page 650 paragraph 1&2).

    6.8. The statute chose the word business an “etymological chameleon” (as per the cited FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8) to give the ICO maximum discretion on disclosure. J Briggs`s judgment is highly relevant. It would be a crime against Equity if the FCA was allowed to continue the concealment by denying the existence on oath of Joel Scott that documents that exist and are the subject of this action.

  7. This hearing is in relation to the meaning of the word “business” in the context of the relevant statute quoted at point 48 of the FTT decision: “the statute states what the statute states”. I am convinced “the statute states what the statute states” for a reason. Accepting the term “business” is an “etymological chameleon” as per the ICO`s reference to FoE v DTI case at point 4 on page 8, one must believe the learned MPs during the readings of the Data Protection Bill in 1998 endorsed the definition of the word “business” to give the ICO discretion in matters like this. It is incumbent on the ICO to use the discretion justly and in accordance with what was in Parliament`s mind. In this instance by refusing to provide the public with the documents being requested, the ICO is apparently concealing an alleged perjury by Stephen Charles Ball (formerly of Lloyds Bank) and that perjury appears to be compounded by the alleged perjury of Joel Christopher Scott of the FCA.

  8. Further to my very recent conversation with Frazer Hunt at the FCA`s Complaints Department, he confirmed the "matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal" on the 12th of December 2018. Added as evidence 30 downloadable at https://bit.ly/2FGYGzs Therefore, I made a request for this Tribunal to make an order for the FCA to release the requested documents. Briggs J heard this matter in relation to CPR 31.17 in 2010 (as suggested at point 67-68 of the FTT decision). I believe the alleged perjured affidavit has not been disclosed by the FCA and I believe that Briggs J`s hearing on 22nd of January 2010 was misled by the FCA into believing there were no more documents. The FSA/FCA apparently ceased their investigation into the Heritage-case in 2008. Clearly, they have additional information about the Perjured Affidavit they are not sharing. They misled Briggs about its existence. At point 10 of evidence no. 26 of Briggs Judgment Briggs J makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007 ”. I would suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document, Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it”. Briggs J concludes his judgment by stating “...I am sorry to disappoint Mr Lampert”. Furthermore, there is some major confusion around Joel Christopher Scott (employee of the then FSA)`s witness statement that is frequently quoted and referred to in Briggs J`s decision, yet the Witness Statement is dated 16 March 2010, which is about two months after the date of Briggs J`s decision. The FCA Complaints Department suggested I took this matter to the Tribunal “Although you have stated that the witness statement provided by the FCA was untrue, your reason for believing this is connected to information that the FCA purportedly held. This matter would be better handled by the relevant court or tribunal”. Email from Frazer Hunt on the 12th of December 2018 as evidence 31 As confirmed in the cited Friends of Earth v DTI decision and in the judgment of Judge Lloyd-Davies dated 7th of March 2017 and by the ICO`s own website, the decision whether to release the requested documents appears to be entirely within the ICO`s domain. "What we do, Our role is to uphold information rights in the public interest." (https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/) "...it is clear that the question of the application of the `gateways` is a matter for the discretion of the ICO acting as a public authority" . It is clear the ICO can release these documents without the FCA`s permission.

  9. Parliament have decided that word “business” is an “etymological chameleon” with the actual definition depending on the context. Regarding the ICO`s submission concerning the meaning of the word "business" as per the Data Protection Bill 1998 section 59 (1) we could argue about the word`s specific meaning in this context forever. However, I suggest the ICO would need to show what was in Parliament’s minds to allow the use of this word to cover up an alleged perjury leading to hundreds of thousands of citizens being evicted from their homes for the benefit of the financial community. I believe the definition of the word “business” has deliberately been made flexible to allow ICO to exercise its discretion. Furthermore, I have been referred to Hansard records by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport as “The information you have requested in available online at the Hansard website: https://hansard.parliament.uk/.” I suggest this may be done by the ICO who have the resources. My argument remains, as I was advised by Prof Nigel Harper former HMRC Banking expert that the following definition would take precedence over all other in Law. The case HMRC at HM Revenue and Customs v Salaried Persons Postal Loans Ltd ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 763 (Ch), Times 20-Apr-06 led to a definition of business activity currently being used by HMRC "business activity means carrying on a trade or profession, or buying and selling goods or services with a view to making a profit or surplus".

  10. It is my strong belief that the precedent set by my case has an enormous role in the current banking/insolvency crisis, especially with references to criminality such as an allegedly perjured Affidavit. I have been advised by a leading solicitor that it should not be public policy to allow regulation to suppress criminality.

  11. With regards to ground 4 in the original submission in front of the First Tier Tribunal in 2016, the public interest has changed and is continuing to change in the direction of transparency and disclosure and openness – which is referred to at point 39 of the cited Cialfi v ICO & Cabinet Office case - especially in the banking insolvency area as shown in Australia (https://www.smh.com.au/business/banking-and-finance/live-banking-and-finance-royal-commission-findings-20180928-p506ke.html) and by the excellent works of the Disclosure Working Group (https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/press-annoucement-disclosure-pilot-approved-by-cprc.pdf). I am convinced proper disclosure of documents may help everyone better understand the abuse of Banking Law. Much of this is due to the efforts of Anthony Stansfeld, Police & Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley.

  12. I am convinced that the FCA is clearly concealing something that is relevant in a case involving an allegedly perjured Affidavit by a bank manager and is tainting the reputation of the ICO and the Courts with that concealment. (The closed part of the FTT hearing was described as "Consideration of the Closed Material, however, while helpful and informative, has not materially influenced the Tribunal`s decision” at point 44 of the First Tier Tribunal decision) An email from Greg Choyce would suggest the FCA were aware of this matter at this highest level. I refer again to point 10 of evidence no. 26 (Briggs Judgment) where the Judge makes the point the FSA confirmed on sworn evidence that “they have provided all the necessary information relating to the memo dated the 14th June 2007”. I would again suggest the information now being sought from the ICO provided by the FCA surely falls into the definition of "all the necessary information”. At point 13 of the same document Judge Briggs says “The evidence given by the FSA is sworn evidence by an employee of the FSA which on this application I accept. There is no evidence to allow me to go behind it.” I now strongly believe there is evidence. I respectfully ask this Tribunal to confirm whether the documents I am seeking would have allowed Briggs J to "go behind" Joel Christopher Scott`s evidence.

  13. The effect of the concealment (of the allegedly perjured Affidavit) by the FCA has been to allow the Court of Appeal (LLOYDS BANK PLC V LAMPERT & ANOR, COURT OF APPEAL - CIVIL DIVISION, NOVEMBER 25, 1998, [1998] EWCA CIV 1840) to stand since 1998. evidence no. 5 on page 45 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018 This has set the precedent that "on demand” means “on demand” (2 banking hours) and that the secured lender can go straight for the Guarantor without first seeking repayment from the Borrower. As best we can tell, this has resulted in hundreds of thousands of evictions that may not have happened (see Experts` Views on page 9 of the submitted bundle on the 10th of October 2018) without this judgment. It is our intention at diyLAW to continue to work with the legal authorities to establish a process to reverse these flawed decisions. diyLAW will also continue to work with Positive Money, as we believe they are the leading experts on the complicated subject of money creation. diyLAW has been circulating #PGcrimes on social media to identify the extent of this banking crisis and to provide information that may help victims.

  14. The ICO throughout this litigation has failed to deal with the very important public interest point. Police and Crime Commissioner Anthony Stansfeld, who takes the lead for PCCs nationally on major fraud, has been in contact with Richard Bailey at the ICO requesting the release of the document due to relevance to other cases on the 22nd of January 2019. email attached as evidence 32 The Tribunal hopefully will decide the public interest issue which involves PCC Anthony Stansfeld overrides whether or not the FCA may be considered a business for the purposes of section 59 DPA. I do not intend to make any further submission on the public interest issue.

  15. Furthermore, my submission for a Private Criminal Prosecution before DJ Cooper has moved on since the FTT decision in September 2016. I suggest that I am entitled to this information even though we have not appealed it as it was meant to go through a Judicial Review. The closed session at the First Tier Tribunal hearing concealed relevant information and the reasoning behind the JR decision was opaque and I have not been able to comprehend it, and nor has it been explained to me. I have appealed that decision as far as possible within the UK. as per the attached document from the Court of Appeal in C1/2017/1490 as evidence 34 As per comments of Charles Harris QC (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/there-is-no-access-to-justice-if-the-public-cannot-understand-it-przdt50rn), I believe I should be provided with a thorough explanation of the C of A decision (reference number: C1/2017/1490).

  16. Anthony Stansfeld, Police Crime Commissioner of Thames Valley Police, needs to be supported in his investigations into Lloyds Bank in Bristol. I will be supporting PCC Stansfeld as best as I can, and I assume Richard Bailey will do the same.

  17. I respectfully ask this Tribunal to instruct the ICO to release the requested documents to me. I apologise for not having had the opportunity to review the precedent sent by the ICO but believe they are in the main precedents set by the FTT and support release of the documents into the public domain.

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.

Know your litigation

  1. At a meeting with the LiP Support Strategy this week I expressed the thought that diyLAW was, due to my history, may be too focused on Bank crimes.
  2. Then - out of the blue-  this letter from my wife’s building insurer arrived.
  3. Very briefly she had a central heating leak causing water damage in our home.
  4. The repair of the leak was not insured, she had paid for the repair. The damage caused by the water leak was insured.
  5. The whole of our downstairs is tiled with the same tile. Some tiles were dug up in order to make the repair. Digging them up destroyed them. It has not been possible to match these tiles up, as they had been laid for some years.
  6. I have been attempting to come up with a solution by clever design for the repaired section, rather than dig up the whole of our ground floor to match tiles now available.
  7. In this process, I have been in contact with the builder, the insurers` loss assessor/adjustor, and their surveyor and an interior designer. This has been going on for some six months.
  8. The letter quoted above “voided” my wife’s insurance claim immediately. They took this action because they claimed failure to disclose business use.
  9. The Agent was at all times aware of my wife`s "business". 
  10. My wife had been very open with the Agent, who she knew well as he had previously arranged mortgages for her.
  11. On investigation, the insurer seems to have a strange web presence. It was highly praised in some reviews – that all seem to have been posted within a short period of time - and slated in others
  12. I found the MD`s direct telephone line and had a conversation with him, which he terminated abruptly.
  13. The conversation was about the claim, whether the agent who arranged the insurance: was the insurance company`s agent or my wife’s agent.
  14. It then went onto discuss the meaning of “business” (shades of my ICO/FCA litigation).
  15. The MD suggested my wife should follow the formal procedure: a complaint from the agent to Vasek as they have no direct contact with their client, then the Ombudsman, and then legal action.
  16. This may possibly take forever and a day, and potentially wears the claimant down into dropping the claim.
  17. My wife then suggested I should look at the Act that was being quoted when they “voided” her insurance for alleged “non-disclosure”.
  18. The Act appears to have been updated: it is now virtually impossible to prove “non-disclosure” in order to void an insurance claim where an agent has been involved (as per the Financial Ombudsman`s publication). 
  19. No matter what litigation you are involved in, this episode demonstrates you need to involve others, keep updated and do not rely on the other side`s interpretation of the Law. 
  20. The Law and the Judiciary are invariably fairer than the other side’s presentation to you.
  21. Watch this space!

 

Jeff Lampert


This blogpost is for information purposes and should not be relied upon as legal advice because it does not consider or take into account your own personal circumstances. If in doubt, seek legal advice.